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ABSTRACT 
This paper is the first to analyze the costs of job loss in Russia, using unique new data 
from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey over the years 2003-2008, including a 
special supplement on displacement that was initiated by us. We employ fixed effects 
regression models and propensity score matching techniques in order to establish the 
causal effect of displacement for displaced individuals. The paper is innovative insofar as 
we investigate fringe and in-kind benefits and the propensity to have an informal 
employment relationship as well as a permanent contract as relevant labor market 
outcomes upon displacement. We also analyze monthly earnings, hourly wages, 
employment and hours worked, which are traditionally investigated in the literature. 
Compared to the control group of non-displaced workers (i.e. stayers and quitters), 
displaced individuals face a significant income loss following displacement, which is 
mainly due to the reduction in employment and hours worked. This effect is robust to the 
definition of displacement. The losses seem to be more pronounced and are especially 
large for older workers with labor market experience and human capital acquired in 
Soviet times and for workers with primary and secondary education. Workers displaced 
from state firms experience particularly large relative losses in the short run, while such 
losses for workers laid off from private firms are more persistent. Turning to the 
additional non-conventional labor market outcomes, there is a loss in terms of the number 
of fringe and in-kind benefits for reemployed individuals but not in terms of their value. 
There is also some evidence of an increased probability of working in informal jobs if 
displaced. These results point towards the importance of both firm-specific human capital 
and of obsolete skills obtained under the centrally planned economy as well as to a wider 
occurrence of job insecurity among displaced workers.  
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JEL classification: J64, J65, P50. 
                                                 
∗ We are grateful to John Bonin, Daniel Hamermesh and participants of an ACES session at the ASSA 
meetings in Denver 2011 and of seminars at IZA, Bonn and the University of Bologna for comments and 
suggestions. Lehmann and Muravyev are grateful to the Volkswagen Foundation for financial support 
within the project “The political economy of labor market reform in transition economies: a comparative 
perspective.” We would also like to thank Vladimir Gimpelson, Rostislav Kapeliushnikov, Mikhail 
Kosolapov and Polina Kozyreva for their invaluable help in developing the RLMS displacement 
supplement.   
♣ Corresponding author: hartmut.lehmann@unibo.it. 
 2
The Wage and Non-wage Costs of Displacement: Evidence from Russia 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in the fate of displaced workers in 
developed economies. This interest has been further heightened by the effects of the 
world financial crisis on the U.S. labor market where displacement at the national level in 
2009 has occurred to an extent not experienced in the last two decades (U.S.BLS 2010). 
In most OECD countries the costs of job loss are large for displaced workers, but these 
costs differ in their nature when we compare the U.S. with Continental European 
countries. In the U.S. labor market where the phenomenon has been studied in great detail 
using various data sets, these costs are long-term even for displaced workers who find re-
employment, with relative wage losses estimated to lie between 7 and 35 percent even 
several years after finding a new job (see Couch and Placzek 2010, Table 1). Most studies 
on displacement in Continental Europe do not find large relative wage losses for 
displaced workers who have found re-employment; instead the main costs of job loss 
consist in foregone earnings due to periods of non-employment (see, e.g., Kuhn 2002 and 
Hijzen et al. 2010).1  
  The consequences of job loss in transition countries have received very scant 
attention in the literature on labor markets in transition countries in spite of large 
restructuring and labor reallocation during the first decade of transition (Djankov and 
Murell 2002). This can be mainly explained by a lack of appropriate data.  Rigorous 
studies on worker displacement in transition economies can be counted on one hand. 
Lehmann, Philips and Wadsworth (2005) and Lehmann, Pignatti and Wadsworth (2006) 
discuss the incidence and the costs of worker displacement in Estonia and Ukraine. In 
                                                 
1 In the U.S. labor market, the costs of job loss are not limited to wage losses and foregone income due to 
non-employment spells. For example, Sullivan and von Wachter (2009) establish that displacement at age 
40 will shorten life expectancy of an average worker by 1.0 to 1.5 years.    
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both studies, the authors find no relative wage losses of re-employed displaced workers, 
but establish large foregone earnings for a majority of workers experiencing very long 
non-employment spells. In contrast, the study by Orazem, Vodopivec and Wu (2005) on 
Slovenia finds lasting relative wage losses of re-employed displaced workers.   
 This is the first paper on the costs of job loss in Russia. Our study attempts to 
isolate the causal effect of displacement on labor market outcomes in Russia, using fixed 
effects regression and propensity score matching models. This analysis has become 
possible thanks to the development of a supplement on displacement, which was 
developed by us and administered on our behalf to the 17th round of the Russian 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) in 2008. The collected supplementary data in 
conjunction with the main body of the RLMS panel data provide a unique data base with 
which the effects of worker displacement in the Russian labor market can be rigorously 
investigated. The main contribution of our paper to the general literature consists in 
looking at three additional labor market outcomes that thus far have found little attention 
by researchers when comparing the labor market experience of displaced and non-
displaced workers, namely fringe and in-kind benefits, the likelihood of having an 
informal job and the probability of having a permanent contract.   
Our study covers the years 2003 to 2008, when the initial transition from a 
centrally planned to a market-oriented economy is over, which makes the Russian labor 
market quite comparable to labor markets in developed economies. Hence, our analysis 
provides an additional interesting data point to the empirical evidence on the costs of job 
loss in OECD economies. These years are also a period of relentless growth of the 
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Russian economy (see table A1).2  We, therefore, investigate whether even during this 
booming period job loss was an important phenomenon in the Russian labor market and 
which costs were associated with worker displacement and how these costs were 
distributed across the workforce. As far as conventional wage costs are concerned, we are 
interested to establish whether the costs consist predominantly in foregone earnings due 
to long spells of non-employment or whether re-employed displaced workers bear lasting 
relative wage losses. These contrasting scenarios have different policy implications. If the 
main costs of job loss are related to long non-employment spells, government policies 
that improve job search of displaced workers seem imperative. If, on the other hand, upon 
re-employment workers experience relative wage losses in a persistent fashion, retraining 
and further training schemes seem to be an appropriate response.  
The non-wage costs that we analyze point to non-conventional labor market 
outcomes that might be of interest to policy makers. If displacement is associated with a 
higher likelihood of taking up informal employment and with a lower incidence of the 
receipt of fringe benefits, then this has important implications for social policy   
The next section presents those features of the Russian system of industrial 
relations that have an impact on the incidence and the costs of displacement as well as on 
the search efforts of displaced workers. This is followed in section 3 by a discussion of 
the data and a descriptive analysis of worker displacement in Russia. In section 4 we 
outline our research strategy, followed by the presentation of the main results in section 
5. Finally, robustness checks are discussed in the penultimate section, while in section 7 
we draw some conclusions.  
  
                                                 
2 In this period the GDP growth rate oscillated between 6 and 8 percent. Also, the world financial crisis had 
no major impact on the Russian labor market in 2008 as inspection of the wage and unemployment data in 
Table A1 attest. 
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2. Pertinent features of the Russian system of industrial relations 
The Russian system of industrial relations has mostly taken shape during the first decade 
of transition to a market economy following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
Prior to 1991, most of the country’s productive assets were controlled by the state while 
trade unions (characterized by almost universal membership) were an integral part of the 
Communist party/state apparatus at all levels, transmitting policy directives of the CPSU 
to the workforce (Borisov and Clarke 2006). In the early 1990s, Russia’s reformist 
government created a legislative framework for a tripartite dialogue, with tripartite 
commissions introduced at the federal and regional levels and annual agreements between 
government, employers, and trade unions negotiated at the level of enterprises, regions, 
and the country as a whole.  
According to formal criteria, by the mid-1990s Russia had an established system 
of industrial relations, characterized by a high unionization rate, multi-level collective 
bargaining, a high coverage rate, and a very high degree of coordination among both 
employees and employers (Cazes 2002). More recent and more careful examinations of 
the country’s industrial relations system, however, have revealed that many of the 
institutions created in the 1990s remained more like an empty framework, that is, a form 
without content. In particular, decisions of the tripartite commission have no legislative 
status under Russian law and are therefore not binding; general agreements concluded 
usually contain many purely declarative provisions, and violations of these agreements 
are typically left without sanctions. The government often violates the principle of 
transparency in decision-making as well as the principle of giving equal weight to the 
three parties involved (Borisov 2001), including some recent steps to marginalize trade 
unions (Borisov and Clarke 2006). Employers’ organizations are often week to serve as a 
counterpart of trade unions and tend to use their seat in tripartite commissions as yet 
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another channel to lobby the government. The largest organization of trade unions in the 
country – The Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR) – has not been 
particularly effective in protecting workers’ interests, and the role of alternative trade 
unions remains limited (Borisov 2001). Perhaps, the most revealing indicator of the 
unstable and immature nature of the existing system of industrial relations in Russia is a 
dramatic decline in the unionization rate. According to Russian Public Opinion Research 
Center, by 2008 trade union membership rate was only 24%, which is close to a four-fold 
decrease in the course of two decades following the collapse of communism 
(Nezavisimaya gazeta 16.10.2008).3  
The general vagueness and the lack of enforcement of collective agreements4 
leave regulations provided in Russia’s labor law a major role in the country’s system of 
industrial relations. Until very recently, a widely held belief was that Russia had very 
rigid – by international comparisons – employment protection legislation (EPL), 
including immense firing costs for employers. For example, Denisova and Svedberg 
(2007) state that “The Russian Labor Code will remain restrictive compared to those in 
OECD countries even in its new revised version.” Similarly, Gimpelson, Kapeliushnikov, 
and Lukyanova (2010) argue that “Whatever of the existing indices we choose, they 
confirm that the Russian EPL, as written in the law, is among the most stringent in the 
                                                 
3 Union density is usually regarded as the most important among the factors influencing wage setting and 
labor relations in general (Eichhorst, Feil, and Braun 2008).  
4The vast gap between what is on paper and reality is well summarized by Venn (2009): “…collective 
bargaining in Russia ostensibly occurs at several different levels, but often there is little real bargaining 
(e.g. agreements are made between trade unions and the government without involving employers). 
National-level bargaining typically comprises general statements of intent and little real content relating to 
wages or working conditions. Sectoral agreements often just replicate legislative standards, while the 
content of regional-level agreements varies widely. Company-level agreements are often not adhered to or 
enforced. Sectoral agreements can be extended by the Minister of Labour if they cover a majority of 
employees in a particular sector, but uncovered employers can opt out of the extension by writing to the 
Minister within 30 days of the extension.”  
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world.”5 However, recent estimates by OECD (2009) show that Russia’s labor law is not 
particularly restrictive even on the books. The OECD EPL score for Russia is just 1.9, 
which is well below the EU average. Of the three components of the overall EPL index, 
Russia only scores high in terms of protection of permanent contracts. The regulations 
regarding fixed-term employment relationships are rather liberal and, what is particularly 
relevant in our context, the regulations pertaining to protection against collective 
dismissals are not rigid.  
Specifically, Russia’s Labor Code stipulates that criteria of mass dismissal are to 
be defined in industrial and (or) territorial agreements. Additional regulations typically 
apply from 50 dismissals upwards (Resolution of Government No. 99 of 05.02.1993). In 
the case of mass dismissals, the employer has to inform the labor administration and the 
trade union in writing three months in advance (compared with two months in the case of 
an individual dismissal). Employers are held to pay severance pay, which cannot exceed 
3 monthly wages, but have no obligations to provide extra compensation or finance 
retraining of dismissed workers. Russia’s Law on employment of 1991 allowed local 
governments to postpone collective dismissals for up to 6 months (with full or partial 
compensation of the employer’s costs) in case they were fraught with severe social 
consequences, but this provision was eliminated in 2004 (see also Muravyev 2010 for 
details about the evolution of Russia’s EPL).  
Another important aspect directly related to the fate of displaced workers 
concerns preemptive rights to retain jobs in case of redundancy dismissals. According to 
Article 178 of Russia’s Labor Code, employers are obliged, when making decisions about 
redundancy firings, to retain workers with higher productivity and higher qualification. 
                                                 
5 Nevertheless, these and other researchers admit that when imperfect enforcement of law is accounted for, 
the level of rigidity is lower: while formally rather restrictive, Russia’s law regarding employment 
protection is effectively rather flexible. 
 8
This provision, which has existed since 1971, can generate negative selection of workers 
and thus result in particularly bad labor market outcomes for displaced workers observed 
in the post-displacement period.  
Unemployment benefits in Russia, as in all other successor states of the former 
USSR, are very non-generous as far as the replacement rate is concerned (Lehmann and 
Muravyev 2010). While the benefits are directly related to past wages of fired workers, 
there is an upper cap effectively restricting them to a very low level. In particular, the 
maximum monthly benefit amounted to 2880 RUR in 2005 and 4900 RUR in 2009, 
which corresponded to 33.7% and 28.3% of the average wage in the two years, 
respectively.  
One important aspect of industrial relations in Russia worth commenting on 
concerns workers’ participation in corporate governance. It is well-known that 
privatization of the 1990s resulted in substantial employee ownership (often majority 
stakes in companies’ equity) in major sectors of Russia’s industry, providing employees 
with a potential channel to influence employment policies via election and representation 
in corporate boards (e.g., Hare and Muravyev 2003). However, there is evidence that 
these rights were rarely used by workers (Filatotchev, Wright, and Bleaney, 1999). 
Moreover, since the end of the mass privatization program in 1994, employee ownership 
has declined dramatically. According to Dolgopiatova (2007), in the middle of the last 
decade workers and trade union representatives typically occupied less than 8% of seats 
in corporate boards. We therefore believe that the influence of workers and trade unions 
on wage and employment policies of firms through corporate governance channels is 
minor if not negligible at all during the period of our analysis. 
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All in all, the described system of industrial relations and of income support for 
the unemployed leads one to moot that neither the former nor the latter attenuate the costs 
of job loss in Russia and that workers experiencing redundancy or plant closure are pretty 
much left to their own devices when confronted with such an adverse labor market event. 
 
3. Data and descriptive analysis 
The analysis uses a database that consists of the panel data of the Russian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (RLMS) for the years 2003 to 2008 and a special supplement on 
displacement that was administered on our behalf to the 17th round of the RLMS between 
October and December 2008.6 The main RLMS data form a well known rich panel data 
set, which has provided the empirical basis of innumerable papers on the Russian labor 
market. We use the main panel data of the years 2003 to 2008 and combine them with the 
new data from the supplement that cover the years 2003 to 2008 and that allow the 
reconstruction of a complete labor market history of each respondent of working age for 
the indicated period. This unique new data base allows us to analyze the costs of job loss 
in Russia for the first time in a rigorous fashion.  
 The supplement provides retrospective information on respondents’ job and non-
employment spells over the years 2003 to 2008. We have information on the beginning 
and the end of each job spell and of each non-employment spell. Vital for our analysis is, 
of course, information on the reason for separating from a job. The possible answers 
given in the supplement are reproduced in table A2 and are very much standard in labor 
force surveys administered in OECD countries. As respondents are told to only give one 
answer it is relatively straightforward to classify job separations into quits and 
                                                 
6 Throughout its history, the data of the main RLMS data set have been collected in the months of October 
to December.  
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displacements.7 Answers 1 through 5 in table A2 are undisputedly related to involuntary 
job loss while answers 6 and 7 infrequently might involve individual dismissals 
connected to improper behavior requiring disciplinary action. In our main analysis we 
classify answers 1 through 7 as involuntary job loss; we also perform robustness checks 
where we tighten the definition of displacement by dropping respondents giving answer 6 
or 7 and find no substantial differences to our main analysis.8  
 We also have information on the actual weekly hours worked, on occupation and 
the sector of employment as well as on the wage at the beginning and the end of each job. 
For those with non-employment who are on the unemployment register we also have 
benefits at the beginning and the end of the registered unemployment spell. In addition, 
and this is particularly relevant for our analysis, we have wages and premia net of taxes 
as well as actual weekly hours worked in March, June, September and December of each 
year over the period 2003 to 2008.  
 We are also interested in the question how displacement affects the number and 
expected value of fringe and in-kind benefits. Respondents are asked to tick from a list of 
11 benefits in the supplement, giving the benefits they receive at the beginning and at the 
end of each job. By far the most important benefits are paid holidays (recipients are 87 
percent of the sample of controls and treated), sick pay (86 percent) and 
maternity/paternity benefits (72 percent). These are all fringe benefits, while in-kind 
benefits are, for example, medical treatment in enterprise-owned polyclinics or sanatoria 
as well as kindergarten services within the enterprise. The answers in these cases, 
however, also allow money transfers to workers for payment of these services in external 
institutions. So, these benefits are in a sense a mixture of in-kind and fringe benefits. 
                                                 
7 For a discussion of the pros and cons of using survey data to define displacement see the introductory 
chapter in Kuhn (2002). 
8 Answers 6 and 7 comprise 16% of the displaced sample. 
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They are at any rate of less importance since only 16, 19 and 4 percent of the sample 
receive them. Since multiple answers are allowed we can establish the number of benefits 
as a labor market outcome. We also exercise care in calculating the expected value of 
each benefit.9   We thus can analyze whether displacement has an impact on the number 
and value of fringe and in-kind benefits for those workers who find re-employment. 
 A second interesting labor market outcome related to displacement, which has 
been ignored in the literature, is informal employment. In this analysis we employ the 
legalistic definition of informal employment, i.e. we define informal employment as the 
absence of social security contributions that by law should be paid by employers and 
employees (cf. World Bank 2007). In the case of our supplement, we proxy informal 
employment if the respondent points to an oral employment agreement between him or 
her and the employer.    
 A main concern with retrospective data is, of course, recall bias, which might be 
especially severe in the case of earnings data. Since the main RLMS questionnaire asks 
for wages of the month previous to the reference week, we can compare wages in the 
main RLMS data set given by respondents who are interviewed in the month of October 
in each year to wages in September in the supplement in each year. We thus can calculate 
the difference of these two wages in each year for these individuals. Both wages are net 
of taxes but the wage in the main data set excludes premia. Hence we would expect that 
the mean of the differences in the two wages is negative, which is indeed the case. What 
is important, though, is whether this negative difference is correlated with the treatment, 
i.e. displacement. We, therefore, perform a simple regression of the difference on a 
                                                 
9 These calculations that are quite cumbersome are not shown here but available upon request. 
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displacement dummy and establish that the coefficient on this dummy is insignificant.10 
We take this as an encouraging sign and conclude that any potential measurement error of 
monthly earnings due to recall bias seems to be orthogonal to our treatment variable.     
 We have merged the supplement data with the main RLMS data for the waves 
2003 to 2008. This allows us to add demographic and household characteristics, 
educational attainment and region of residence at annual frequencies. Table 1 gives 
descriptive statistics of the variables for the non-displaced and the displaced in 2003 that 
are used in the fixed effects regressions and the propensity score matching procedures. 
  We start our descriptive analysis of worker displacement in Russia with the 
presentation of annual quit and displacement rates for the years 2003 to 2008.   We see in 
the upper panel of figure 1 that many workers quit in this boom period and that quit rates 
are a multiple of displacement rates. However, the displacement rate is not negligible, 
reaching more than 3 percent in several years, which in comparison with mature capitalist 
economies is at the lower end of but, nevertheless, within the range of displacement rates 
(Kuhn 2002). How do the Russian displacement rates compare to layoff numbers in other 
transition economies? The Russian are of the same magnitude as the displacement rates 
found in Slovenia in the early years of transition (Orazem et al. 2005) and somewhat 
lower than those found in Ukraine (Lehmann et al. 2006). In Estonia displacement rates 
were very high in early transition, reaching 13 percent in 1992 and coming down to 
around 6 percent at the end of the decade. The Estonian economy was, however, shedding 
labor in a very aggressive fashion at the beginning of the transition, leading to 
excessively high job loss rates in international perspective (Lehmann et al. 2005). So, 
                                                 
10 Using 21,804 observations, the estimated equation gives: Diff=-614.25(t=15.37) – 131.07*displacement 
(t=-1.06). It shows that the mean difference is indeed negative and, given the large number of observations 
and the low t-statistic on the displacement dummy, that there is no systematic difference between the mean 
difference of the non-displaced and the mean difference of the displaced. 
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displacement is an important phenomenon in the Russian labor market even in years 
when the economy booms, affecting ca. 2 million workers per year. Plant or firm closures 
are responsible only for a minor part of displacements; the dominant reason for job loss is 
clearly redundancies as the bottom panel of figure 1 demonstrates.11   
 Are displaced workers systematically different from non-displaced workers? 
Inspection of the columns of non-displaced and displaced workers in table 1 allows us to 
infer that the latter are more likely to be female, have less tenure, be less educated, be less 
skilled, work in smaller and privately owned firms, be employed in construction, trade 
and consumer services and agriculture, and receive somewhat lower wages. These 
unconditional results are confirmed by multinomial regressions where the origin state is 
employment and remaining employed, being displaced and quitting are the three 
destination states.12 
   How rapidly do displaced workers return to work? To answer this question we 
calculate cumulative return rates to employment, conditional on non-employment 
duration, for the years 2003 to 2008.13 In Russia, around 50% of displaced workers return 
to full-time work within the first three months after displacement while one-third of the 
workers returns within one month of displacement. At least half of all those who return to 
work within six months do so during the first month. These job moves within one month 
can be considered job-to-job moves. Kuhn (2002) finds similar results for displaced 
workers in the U.S.; two-thirds of them are re-employed within six months. In Britain, 
half of the displaced workers return within two months. In Russia, it takes a year for two 
                                                 
11 The small number of displaced due to plant or firm closure implies that we cannot investigate the effects 
of displacement for this sub-group separately. 
12 To save space we do not show the MNL results; they are, however, available upon request. 
13 These rates are based on the complement of the Kaplan-Meier estimator of survivor functions in non-
employment (Smith 2002).  The results are only discussed here and not presented. However, they are 
available upon request. 
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thirds of the displaced to find re-employment, leading to relatively modest levels of long-
term non-employment.14 Lehmann et al. (2005) find a similar picture in the case of 
Estonian displaced workers in the 1990s, with between 53 and 65 percent gaining re-
employment within 6 months. Since Estonia has been considered one of the most 
dynamic economies in the 1990s among transition countries, this seems to indicate that 
the Russian labor market has become quite dynamic in the growth period of 2003 to 
2008, capable of absorbing the majority of displaced workers within a year. 
 Even if most displaced workers are reabsorbed by the Russian labor market within 
a year after job loss, we know from the literature that independent of the state of the 
economy displacement does impose large costs on workers who are separated from their 
jobs involuntarily. We now turn to a rigorous evaluation of these costs.  
 
4. Research strategy 
The fixed effect regressions that we perform are very much standard in the displacement 
literature and of the following type: 
 
 
 
where yit is labor market outcome for individual i at time t and an element of the set 
{monthly earnings, employment rate, hours worked, hourly wage, number of benefits, 
value of benefits, Prob(oral contract) and Prob(permanent written contract)}. To take 
account of unobserved time-invariant factors impacting on yit that are potentially 
                                                 
14 We do not distinguish between unemployment and inactivity here for two reasons. First, the number of 
observations of displaced workers is small which makes it difficult to find reliable estimates for the two 
separate labor market states. Second, given the non-generous unemployment benefit systems in Russia, it is 
difficult for most workers to maintain themselves and their families entirely with the help of unemployment 
benefits. This leads to fluid borders between the states of unemployment and inactivity. Hence, it is better 
to treat the two states as one. 
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heterogeneous across individuals we include the individual-specific fixed effect αi. Qt is a 
set of quarterly time dummies, while Xit contains the set of covariates shown in table 1. 
Ever since the seminal job loss study of Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan (1993) who 
found earnings losses of displaced workers even before the displacement occurred, 
researchers have entered a lag-and-lead structure of displacement dummies. Our dummy 
j
itDIS is set equal to 1 for quarter j if worker i was displaced at time t. In our specification, 
the coefficient jδ  captures the effect of displacement on the outcome variable up to four 
quarters before job loss took place (j=-4), during the quarter when displacement occurred 
(j=0) as well as up to 16 quarters after the event (j=16). Finally, itε is a white noise error 
term. In the case that unobserved heterogenous factors are exclusively time-invariant the 
displacement effects are identified with our fixed effects regression model through the 
coefficients jδ . However, when some of the unobserved factors vary over time, the 
coefficients jδ are no longer consistently estimated and our analysis needs to employ a 
different approach.  
When evaluating the costs of worker i’s displacement we essentially ask the 
question that is posed in the evaluation literature: What is the outcome (e.g., monthly 
earnings, employment status etc.) of worker i who is treated (here: displaced) relative to 
the hypothetical outcome that would have prevailed if the same worker had not been 
treated (displaced)? Since the treated worker can never be observed in the non-treatment 
state the problem arises how to construct a credible counterfactual. When the treatment is 
randomized, under certain assumptions it is sufficient to compare the average outcome of 
the treated ( ( (1) | 1)i iE Y D = ) and the average outcome of the control group (i.e. the non-
 16
treated) ( (0) | 0)i iE Y D = . The difference in these two average outcomes will identify the 
average treatment effect of the treated (ATT): 
( (1) | 1) ( (0) | 1) (2)i i i iATT E Y D E Y D= = − = , 
where ( (0) | 1)i iE Y D = is the counterfactual average outcome, i.e. the average outcome of 
the treated in the non-treatment state. With randomized experiments, if we do not 
encounter “randomization and substitution biases” (Heckman and Smith 1996), 
( (0) | 1)i iE Y D = = ( (0) | 0)i iE Y D = , 
i.e. the average outcome of the non-treated is a consistent estimate of the counterfactual 
( (0) | 1)i iE Y D = . 
Alas, displacement is never a randomized treatment and we need to employ those 
techniques of the evaluation literature that are applied to observational data (see, e.g., 
Heckman, Lalonde and Smith 1999). Essentially these techniques try to get 
( (0) | 0)i iE Y D =  as close as possible to the counterfactual ( (0) | 1)i iE Y D = . In this study, 
we employ the propensity score matching procedure proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983). For identification of a causal treatment effect they invoke the conditional 
independence assumption (CIA): conditional on workers’ pre-treatment characteristics, 
the potential outcome in the non-treatment scenario is independent of the treatment status, 
i.e. 
( (0) | 1, ( )) ( (0) | 0, ( )) (3)i i i iE Y D P X E Y D P X= = =  
where Di is the treatment variable that takes the value 1 under treatment and the value 0 if 
the individual is in the non-treatment state, while Yi(0) is the outcome variable for 
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individual i in the non-treatment state.  P(X) is the propensity score, estimated with the 
probit model: 
( ) Pr( 1| ) (4)P X D X= = . 
Matching takes place on the propensity score using the nearest neighbor method.  
 Workers who in March 2004 are between 15 and 59 years of age and who have at 
least one year of tenure enter our sample.15 As controls we take those who remain in their 
jobs (stayers) and those who quit (quitters).16  Our final sample consists of 3097 
individuals, 443 of whom are identified as displaced using the classification of table A2. 
The covariates presented in table 1 are used for our propensity score matching procedure. 
All variables are lagged one year, so we match on the propensity score estimated with the 
covariate values of March 2003. Table 1 also shows for the overall sample that balancing 
is achieved with virtually all covariates.  
At an intuitive level, propensity score matching attempts to balance the 
unobserved characteristics of two samples by balancing the observed characteristics. This 
works particularly well when the number of covariates is large and includes those 
variables that are potentially correlated with the outcome variable of interest in an 
exhaustive fashion. Given the large number of such variables shown in table 1 we are 
pretty sure that we balance the unobserved characteristics with our matching procedure. 
Balancing of the observed characteristics is achieved with all samples that we use in our 
analysis. We are thus confident to identify the causal effect of displacement in quarter j 
by the difference in the average outcome in quarter j of those displaced at time t and the 
average outcome of the controls in quarter j: 
                                                 
15 With the first condition we focus on the core workforce and can ignore retirement issues, while the 
second condition ensures that we look only at workers who have relatively stable employment 
relationships. We also require that there is no missing information. 
16 The recent literature selects both stayers and quitters as controls, since choosing only stayers as controls 
might lead to an upward bias of displacement effects. 
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j j
j it i it iE Y D P X E Y D P X∆ = = − = ,  
j=-4,..,0,…16. Analytical standard errors are calculated using the algorithm developed by 
Lechner (2001). 
 
5. Empirical findings 
We first present the labor market outcomes that are standard in the literature for all 
individuals as well as for all re-employed. Column 1 of table 2 lists the four quarters 
before displacement, the quarter when displacement occurs (bef_d_0) and the sixteen 
quarters after job loss. For the four standard outcomes we report the coefficients jδ  of 
the fixed effects regressions and the differences between mean outcomes of the treated 
and mean outcomes of the controls, j∆ , with the controls being determined by our 
propensity score matching routine.  The results of the two estimation techniques are quite 
similar for all four outcomes even though the displacement effects based on the 
propensity score matching are somewhat larger.  In the discussion that follows we focus 
on these latter results. 
 In the pre-displacement period monthly earnings17 are not significantly lower for 
the displaced, a scenario that is contrary to the findings of, e.g., the earnings profiles in 
the U.S. labor market (see, e.g., Jacobson et al. 1993) but often found in the literature on 
displacement in European countries.  Monthly earnings drop dramatically in the quarter 
of displacement and reach their lowest level in the first two quarters after job loss. These 
earnings losses are large as they amount to roughly 35 percent of the average wage 
(11700 Rubles for the controls in the quarter of displacement). They are attenuated with 
                                                 
17 As a first approximation,  we follow the literature in imputing zero earnings for the unemployed. Later 
on, we perform robustness checks where we take into account the level of unemployment benefits when 
estimating losses in monthly earnings.   
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time but still amount to approximately 26 percent of the average wage two years after job 
loss (8 quarters after job loss the average wage of controls has grown to roughly 12750 
Rubles); only after three years do the monthly earnings losses become statistically 
insignificant.  The second earnings outcome is the hourly wage, which has a similar 
profile over time as monthly earnings. In the four quarters before job loss the hourly 
wage of the displaced does not differ from that of the non-displaced, while in the quarter 
of displacement we have a huge loss amounting to roughly 50 percent of the average 
hourly wage (about 63 Rubles). This loss is reduced to around a quarter of the average 
hourly wage within two years (when the average hourly wage of controls amounts to 69 
Rubles) and disappears completely after three years.  
 These very large losses in monthly earnings and the hourly wage come about 
because of a substantial reduction in weekly hours worked and because of large falls in 
the employment rates of displaced workers.  One year after job loss displaced workers 
work on average nearly 10 hours per week less than their non-displaced counterparts. 
This deficit in hours worked remains throughout the reported period and amounts to 
around 6 hours even 4 years after workers were displaced. With the onset of job loss the 
average employment rate falls by 44 percentage points18, i.e. we see a large inflow into 
non-employment. Within a year the gap between the employment rate of the non-
displaced and the displaced falls to 25 percentage points and remains around 20 
percentage points for the rest of the reported period.  
 The last four columns of table 2 present the results for the hourly wage of those 
displaced workers who found re-employment. We look at all re-employed and at the 
                                                 
18 Since before displacement both controls and displaced have a 100 percent employment rate, a fall of 44 
percentage points amounts to a 44 percent fall. 
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subset of those who switched industry. We investigate the latter group to see whether the 
loss of industry-specific human capital has a negative impact on wages of re-employed 
displaced workers, a finding established by Neal (1995) for the United States.  The results 
for all re-employed show no relative wage losses as they are found in the U.S. labor 
market (Couch and Placzek 2010). These findings for Russia are in line with the evidence 
for several European countries, though. For those displaced workers who upon re-
employment switch industry we essentially also find no evidence of a relative wage loss. 
So, in times of strong economic growth of the Russian economy loss of industry-specific 
human capital does not seem to affect wages of re-employed displaced workers. 
 The evidence presented in table 2 for the whole sample is clear cut. The main 
costs of job loss in the Russian labor market are foregone earnings due to spells of non-
employment and reduced hours worked. At the same time, re-employed displaced 
workers are not penalized by earning lower wages than their non-displaced counterparts.   
 In the descriptive section, we established that the incidence of displacement is not 
evenly distributed across workers. In addition, empirical findings in the literature point to 
the fact that the costs of job loss are not evenly spread over the set of displaced workers.  
For example, Ichino et al. (2007) find lower employment rates for older displaced 
workers in Austria immediately following job loss; these older workers, however, catch 
up with their younger counterparts in the longer term. Kletzer and Fairlie (2003) establish 
that in the U.S. labor market young displaced workers have shorter-lived earnings losses 
than the main group of displaced workers. Schwerdt et al. (2010) find earnings losses that 
are larger and more persistent for white-collar workers, relating this finding to the 
importance of firm-specific human capital.  
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 In a first stab at the data we, therefore, take account of this potential heterogeneity 
in outcomes by investigating the displacement effects with respect to monthly earnings, 
the hourly wage, the employment rate and the hourly wage upon re-employment for 
various subsets of the displaced. We splice the data by gender, by previous employment 
in a state vs. private firm, by age and by educational attainment. When it comes to age we 
divide the sample into those individuals who were younger than 18 years of age in 1991 
and those who were older than or equal to 18 years, since we are interested to see whether 
potentially obsolete skills acquired under the Soviet regime have an impact on the labor 
market outcomes of the displaced. In the case of educational attainment we compare 
displaced workers with tertiary education (high education) to those with secondary 
education or less (low education). 
 Figure 2 presents the outcomes dividing the displacement sample by gender. The 
results using the propensity score matching procedure are presented together with 95 
percent confidence intervals.19 Monthly earnings do not differ much by gender even if in 
absolute terms losses for males are somewhat higher than for their female counterparts. In 
relative terms these losses are close to each other since female earnings are substantially 
lower than male earnings. There is some difference as far as the persistence of earnings 
losses are concerned: males reach the same level of earnings as the non-displaced 
approximately within two years while in the case of females it takes an additional year to 
eliminate earnings losses. The same pattern can be observed with hourly wages. 
Displaced women have a slightly steeper fall in the employment rate upon job loss but 
over the long term their employment rates recover faster than those of their male 
                                                 
19 These confidence intervals are based on the analytical standard errors developed by Lechner (2001). 
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counterparts. Finally, neither men nor women experience any relative wage losses upon 
re-employment. 
 Throughout the reported period after occurred job loss, displaced workers who 
previously worked in private firms have larger monthly earnings losses in absolute terms 
than displaced workers with previous employment in state firms (first panel of figure 3). 
However, in relative terms the picture is more complex. The average monthly earnings of 
the workers not displaced form state firms remain roughly constant between quarters 0 
and 16, hovering around 7500 Rubles, while the average monthly earnings of the workers 
not displaced from private firms grow from around 14000 Rubles in quarter 0 to around 
19000 Rubles in quarter 15. So, relative earnings losses for those displaced from state 
firms are larger than such losses for those displaced from private firms in the short term. 
For example, in quarters 1 and 2 absolute losses of 3243 and 2948 Rubles for the former 
group translate into relative losses of 41 and 37 percent respectively. In contrast, the 
absolute losses in these quarters for those displaced from private firms, 4342 and 4517 
Rubles, amount to 31 and 30 percent respectively. In the longer term, however, those 
displaced from state-owned firms incur smaller losses whether measured in absolute or 
relative terms, since after the 6th quarter earnings losses do not exist or are no longer 
significant for this group while they remain significant for those displaced from private 
firms throughout the rest of the observed quarters.  The hourly wage profiles shown in the 
second panel of figure 3 are very similar to those of monthly earnings. There are at least 
two explanations why workers displaced from state firms have less persistent earnings 
and wage losses than those workers displaced from private firms. First, some of the 
workers with previous employment in state firms are eventually hired by private firms 
where wages are on average higher and grow. Consequently initial earnings losses are 
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relatively rapidly recovered. Second, the fact that average earnings and wages grow in 
private firms might be an indication of the importance of firm-specific human capital in 
these firms. Hence, workers who are displaced from private firms might incur these 
persistent earnings and wage losses because of a large loss of firm-specific human capital 
that workers displaced from state firms do not incur. Upon job loss the fall in the 
employment rate is much larger for workers from state firms and remains below the 
employment rate of workers from private firms for 6 quarters. So, also on this measure 
the losses of workers displaced from private firms are more persistent. For the re-
employed of both sub-groups there are no relative wage losses throughout the entire 
period.  
 We next compare the labor market outcomes of the cohort that acquired most of 
its human capital under central planning (workers older than 18 years in 1991) and of the 
cohort with human capital acquisition in the transition period (workers younger or equal 
to 18 years in 1991).20   Monthly earnings losses are very different across the two 
samples. The cohort with “old” human capital has large and persistent monthly earnings 
losses while for the cohort with “new” human capital these losses are short-lived: two 
quarters after displacement earnings losses become insignificant for the latter group while 
they persist nearly three years for the group with “old” human capital. In contrast, 
persistent hourly wage losses can also be observed for the cohort with “new” human 
capital, remaining statistically significant for nine quarters after job loss. The cohort with 
the “old” capital experiences these losses for 11 quarters. Monthly earnings losses are 
large and so persistent for the group with the “old” capital in particular because the 
                                                 
20 We cannot distinguish these cohort effects from age effects, though. In an earlier version of the paper, we 
have experimented also with disaggregating by age (old vs. young) and found that the losses were larger for 
older individuals (older than 40). However, with the richest specification of the propensity score used in the 
current version it did not balance for age groups. Thus, we have decided to report only the cohort effects 
here. 
 24
employment rates are strongly negatively affected throughout the reported period (see the 
third panel in figure 4). The employment losses of the group with “new” capital, on the 
other hand, are smaller and restricted to the first three years after job loss. We take these 
results as evidence that part of the capital acquired under the Soviet regime is obsolete, 
which makes it difficult for displaced workers with human capital acquired under central 
planning to find re-employment. However, independent of the cohort to which displaced 
workers belong there are no relative earnings losses for those who find re-employment 
(fourth panel in figure 4). 
 The last characteristic that we investigate is educational attainment. Displaced 
workers with tertiary education incur substantially smaller earnings losses than displaced 
workers with at most secondary education, and this even though the average wages of the 
controls from the first group are much higher. For example at the time of job loss highly 
educated controls have average monthly earnings of about 17000 Rubles while controls 
with low education have average monthly earnings of only 10600 Rubles. Given that the 
absolute short-run earnings losses are larger for workers with low education and that 
earnings losses remain persistent only for this group, university trained workers seem to 
encounter little problems in finding new employment with a remuneration, which is 
similar to the one received in the old job. This can also be seen with the profiles of hourly 
wages for the two groups, where workers with low education have persistent wage losses, 
while highly educated workers encounter a significant wage penalty only during the 
quarter of the actual job loss.  A difference in job search effectiveness can be clearly seen 
in the third panel of figure 5, which shows losses in terms of employment rates. Highly 
educated displaced workers converge to the employment rates of the controls about two 
years after job loss while displaced workers with low education have a significant deficit 
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in the employment rate that never falls below 14 percentage points throughout the period.  
As in the case of the other characteristics there are no hourly wage penalties for those 
among the two sub-groups who find re-employment. 
 Summarizing the results of this analysis of labor market outcomes for the chosen 
sub-groups, we find that in all cases the costs of job loss are foregone earnings due to 
non-employment spells. Relative wage penalties for the re-employed cannot be 
established for any of the sub-groups, neither in the short- nor in the long-term. We also 
show that the costs of job loss do not differ by gender. On the other hand, our evidence 
points to the existence of types of workers who are particularly hard hit by job loss, 
namely workers with low education and “old” capital. For workers who are displaced 
from state and private firms the results are less clear cut. Workers dismissed from state 
firms encounter larger relative losses in the short-run than their counterparts who are laid 
off from private firms. The situation is reversed in the longer term since workers coming 
from private firms have more persistent losses in monthly earnings and hourly wages. 
 Labor market outcomes that are not standard in the literature are presented in table 
3 for the entire sample of re-employed displaced workers. The first four columns deal 
with job security upon re-employment. There is a substantial penalty for displaced 
workers in terms of permanent contracts. Focusing on the propensity score results, we can 
see that displaced workers have a reduced likelihood of concluding a permanent written 
contract, which is persistent over the entire period. The mirror image of this is an 
increased probability to have an informal employment relationship, which we proxy with 
the oral agreement without a written contract. This increased probability is between 4 and 
10 percent and increasing in the quarters of job loss, i.e. the more time has passed since 
job loss occurred the larger the probability that a re-employed displaced person finds 
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himself or herself in an informal job. Hence, even in times of strong economic growth 
displacement is associated with increased employment insecurity and an increased 
number of low quality jobs.  
 The second type of non-standard outcome we are interested in is the number and 
value of fringe and in-kind benefits (columns 5-8 of table 3). The re-employed displaced 
workers encounter a relative loss of the number of benefits, amounting to between 
roughly one half and one benefit. However, there is no loss in terms of the value of 
benefits. These contrasting results seem to point to the fact if displaced workers find re-
employment the benefits that they have lost upon job loss had some among them with 
low value while in their new jobs they receive less benefits than the non-displaced but 
this smaller number consists of benefits with larger value.  
 
6. Robustness Checks 
In most studies on job loss monthly earnings losses are calculated imputing zero earnings 
for displaced workers who are unemployed. As a robustness check we estimate earnings 
losses imputing monthly earnings of the unemployed by the level of unemployment 
benefits. In Russia only registered unemployed receive benefits. Since the supplement 
provides information on the level of these benefits for the registered unemployed at the 
beginning of their unemployment spell and for the last month they receive benefits, we 
re-estimate monthly earnings losses with the initial and the final level of benefits, using 
the propensity score matching procedure. Comparing the columns 2 and 3 of table 4a 
with the results in table 2 we find negligible differences between the two computing 
methods. The earnings losses are in general slightly smaller with unemployment benefits 
imputed as we would expect, but the levels as well as the persistence are very similar.  
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 A second robustness check consists in the tightening of the displacement 
definition. We exclude those workers from the displacement sample who separated from 
their jobs because of reasons 6 and 7 given in table A2. A “dismissal initiated by 
employer” as well as “personnel reduction” might entail individual layoffs connected to 
unsatisfactory performance or disciplinary problems. In addition, these two types of 
dismissals might hit low productivity workers especially hard who in all likelihood 
perform worse upon job loss than displaced workers who separated from their jobs for 
one of the reasons 1 through 5 given in table A2. There are some differences regarding 
monthly earnings losses (see column 3 in table 2 versus column 4 in table 4a). Between 
quarters 2 and 10 monthly earnings losses are smaller when we use the tighter definition 
of displacement hinting at the possibility that workers dismissed for reasons 6 and 7 are 
more likely to be of lower productivity and thus perform worse after job loss. This 
conjecture seems to be confirmed by the results regarding the other labor market 
outcomes. Losses in hours and the hourly wage as well as the shortfalls in the 
employment rates are smaller in table 4a than in table 2 throughout all quarters after 
displacement, confirming the “better quality” of the displaced when using the tighter 
definition. However, monthly earnings losses seem more persistent when we use the 
narrower definition of displacement. Finally, we do not find any wage penalty for re-
employed narrowly defined displaced workers, a result common to all analyzed samples 
and sub-samples. 
 An especially vulnerable group among the displaced might be workers who are 
laid off without prior notification. This restricted set of displaced workers might in 
addition point to a selection problem, which manifests itself in particularly poor 
performance upon job loss. Employing this sample of the displaced we do find slightly 
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higher monthly earnings losses (column 2 of table 4b). What is particularly striking is the 
persistence of these losses, which are absent with the broader definition of displacement. 
However, when we compare losses in hours worked and shortfalls in the employment 
rates there are no discernible differences for the two samples. Again, also for this sample 
there is no evidence of a relative wage penalty for the re-employed.    
 Our next robustness check alters the definition of controls by keeping only stayers 
in this group. In the early literature on displacement stayers were used to construct a 
counterfactual. However, more recently students of displacement have argued that stayers 
are too “stable” a group to be a credible counterfactual for the displaced. Instead, both 
stayers and quitters should be used for the construction of this credible counterfactual, 
since for a displaced worker the non-treatment state might be either staying at the firm or 
quitting the firm. In times of strong economic growth most workers who quit their firm 
should relatively rapidly find new employment with earnings conditions that might be at 
least as good as in the old job. Only if there is a substantial fraction of quitters who have 
difficulties finding a new job, should removing them from the sample of controls lead to 
upward biases regarding losses in labor market outcomes. Comparing columns 6 through 
8 in table 4b with the respective columns in table 2, we find slightly higher losses at some 
quarters, but in general upward biases are not visible. Again, also with this control group 
no relative wage penalty can be detected. 
 The last robustness check redefines the labor market outcome “informality” by 
stipulating that a job is informal if workers do not receive paid holidays, sick pay and 
maternity/paternity benefits on the job. This definition is more encompassing than using 
an oral contract as the defining criterion: virtually all displaced workers on oral contracts 
lack the receipt of the three fringe benefits, while a substantial fraction the displaced who 
 29
are on permanent contracts also does not receive these benefits. Table 5 presents the fixed 
effects and the matching results using this alternative definition of informality as the 
labor market outcome of interest. Both sets of results are substantially higher than the 
results with an oral contract as the basis of the definition of informality (columns 4 and 5 
of table 3). Particularly striking is the fact that there is an increased likelihood of being 
informal even before displacement takes place. Hence, when the absence of the three 
main fringe benefits defines an informal job, displaced workers in Russia experience 
slightly more job insecurity than the rest of the workforce even before job loss occurs. 
 Our robustness checks have shown that the large losses in monthly earnings, the 
hourly wage, hours worked and the employment rate are present whatever sample of 
displaced or controls or definitions of labor market outcomes we use. They also establish 
that in the case of especially vulnerable groups the losses are somewhat larger. One result 
that is also never altered is the absence of a wage penalty for re-employed displaced 
workers.   
 
7. Conclusions 
We use a unique data base that combines the main RLMS panel data set of the years 2003 
to 2008 with a supplement on displacement that was administered with the main 17th 
wave of the RLMS in the months of October to December 2008. The supplement is 
comprised for the most part of retrospective data covering the years 2003 to 2008. A first 
analysis of the retrospective data on monthly earnings produces evidence that potential 
measurement error due to recall bias is not correlated with the treatment (displacement). 
It is, therefore, very unlikely that our results are driven by recall bias. 
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 To address selection problems connected to displacement we employ fixed effects 
regressions and propensity score matching techniques. With the latter approach we 
invoke the conditional independence assumption which says that once we match controls 
and the displaced on the propensity score there are no differences in unobserved 
characteristics that impact on the labor market outcomes that we analyze: monthly 
earnings, hours worked, hourly wages, employment, hourly wages upon re-employment, 
number and value of benefits and the likelihood of having an informal job. We are quite 
confident that we can establish a causal effect of displacement on these outcomes. 
 We find large and persistent income losses as a consequence of displacement due 
to a fall in hours worked and employment. We never establish a wage penalty for those 
displaced who find new employment. So, like in many European countries the costs of 
job loss in Russia are foregone earnings due to long spells of non-employment.  
Robustness checks that use different definitions of displacement or alter the composition 
of the control group confirm this result unequivocally. 
 We splice the data by gender and, in addition, look at specific sub-groups in order 
to understand, which types of individuals are particularly vulnerable to the consequences 
of job loss and whether the loss of firm-specific human capital or obsolete human capital 
from Soviet times can explain these costs of job loss. Gender is not a dividing 
characteristic as far as the costs of job loss are concerned. Workers displaced from state 
firms have higher earnings in the short run than workers who experience a layoff from a 
private firm. This relationship is reversed in the longer term as the loss in firm-specific 
human capital seems to hit workers from private firms harder than those laid off from 
state firms. We also show that obsolete skills acquired under the Soviet regime makes it 
more difficult for older workers to find re-employment than for those displaced workers 
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who accumulated labor market experience and human capital during the transition. We 
also show that workers with at most primary education have a much harder time to flow 
back into employment upon job loss than workers with tertiary education, which is 
reflected in much larger and more persistent earnings losses of the former group. 
 The analysis on non-conventional labor market outcomes shows increased job 
insecurity for Russian displaced workers since upon re-employment they persistently 
have a reduced likelihood of concluding a permanent written contract. The mirror image 
of this is an increased probability to have an informal employment relationship, which we 
proxy with the oral agreement without a written contract. This increased probability is 
between 4 and 10 percent and increasing in the quarters of job loss, i.e. the more time has 
passed since job loss occurred the larger the probability that a re-employed displaced 
person finds himself or herself in an informal job. We also find that re-employed 
displaced workers encounter a relative loss of the number of benefits, amounting to 
between roughly one half and one benefit. However, there is no loss in terms of the value 
of benefits. This latter result seems to say that benefits in new jobs, while less numerous, 
have higher unit value. 
 The central point of interest for policy makers that our evidence establishes is that 
no matter which sample we use and how we split the sample, the costs of job loss in 
Russia consist in large foregone earnings due to less employment and less hours worked 
and not in wage penalties upon re-employment.  This is maybe not that surprising given 
that we report about displacement in a period of growth when earnings in the dominant 
private sector grow steadily. The main policy conclusion from this result points at the 
great importance of job brokerage by the state and courses that entice displaced workers 
to improve the efficacy of their job search. 
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FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1: Separations and Layoffs  
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RLMS supplement on displacement. 
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Labor market outcomes by sub-groups  
 
Figure 2: Males vs. females 
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Figure 3: previous employment in state vs. private firm 
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Figure 4: Workers older than 18 years in 1991 vs. workers younger than or equal to 
18 years in 1991 
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Figure 5: Higher (tertiary) vs. secondary or lower education 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on RLMS panel data and RLMS supplement on displacement. 
 44
TABLES 
 
 
Table 1: Observable characteristics used for propensity score matching and their 
balance  
 
  Mean Mean Standardized p >| t | 
  Treated Controls bias  
Age U 39.811 39.560 2.378 0.042
       M 39.811 40.058 -2.338 0.738 
Male U 0.429 0.449 -4.067 0.776 
       M 0.429 0.462 -6.573 0.337 
Married U 0.744 0.772 -6.690 0.086 
       M 0.744 0.755 -2.721 0.694 
Tenure U 110.862 120.225 -7.875 0.075 
       M 110.862 103.790 5.948 0.370 
State owned firm U 0.524 0.609 -17.210 0.000 
       M 0.524 0.512 2.590 0.708 
Hours worked per week U 42.738 41.957 7.625 0.209 
       M 42.738 42.969 -2.257 0.759 
Monthly earnings U 9979.832 10809.80 -9.200 0.712 
       M 9979.832 9949.681 0.334 0.959 
Primary education U 0.093 0.083 3.543 0.684 
       M 0.093 0.100 -2.464 0.729 
Secondary education U 0.732 0.657 16.359 0.000 
       M 0.732 0.737 -1.015 0.877 
Higher education U 0.175 0.260 -20.756 0.000 
       M 0.175 0.163 2.839 0.649 
North-West U 0.077 0.082 -1.779 0.320 
       M 0.077 0.093 -6.034 0.392 
Central-Volga U 0.298 0.364 -13.884 0.001 
       M 0.298 0.275 4.962 0.451 
South U 0.107 0.143 -10.935 0.102 
       M 0.107 0.117 -2.819 0.665 
Moscow-St.Petersburg U 0.200 0.184 4.296 0.257 
       M 0.200 0.152 12.423 0.060 
Written permanent contract U 0.930 0.936 -2.494 0.993 
       M 0.930 0.930 0.000 1.000 
Written temporary contract U 0.033 0.038 -3.111 0.128 
       M 0.033 0.037 -2.518 0.711 
“dogovor podriada” U 0.007 0.006 1.096 0.980 
       M 0.007 0.009 -2.888 0.705 
Oral agreement U 0.030 0.019 7.147 0.033 
       M 0.030 0.023 4.501 0.527 
Firm size: 1-5 U 0.049 0.040 4.122 0.392 
       M 0.049 0.040 4.510 0.507 
Firm size: 6-20 U 0.156 0.133 6.611 0.028 
       M 0.156 0.138 5.302 0.441 
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Firm size: 21-50 U 0.198 0.160 9.879 0.191 
       M 0.198 0.217 -4.865 0.501 
Firm size: 51-100 U 0.156 0.168 -3.239 0.933 
       M 0.156 0.166 -2.528 0.711 
Firm size: 101-500 U 0.193 0.240 -11.227 0.011 
       M 0.193 0.196 -0.566 0.931 
Firm size: >500 U 0.247 0.259 -2.643 0.287 
       M 0.247 0.245 0.536 0.937 
Light and Food Industry U 0.082 0.064 6.890 0.058 
       M 0.082 0.072 3.592 0.609 
Civil Machine Building U 0.056 0.056 0.042 0.773 
       M 0.056 0.061 -2.028 0.771 
Military Industrial Complex U 0.019 0.026 -5.086 0.299 
       M 0.019 0.019 0.000 1.000 
Oil and Gas U 0.019 0.026 -5.266 0.159 
       M 0.019 0.030 -7.847 0.270 
Other Heavy Industry U 0.030 0.034 -2.112 0.750 
       M 0.030 0.023 3.961 0.527 
Construction U 0.110 0.066 15.531 0.001 
       M 0.110 0.098 4.131 0.576 
Transportation, Communication U 0.068 0.097 -10.562 0.091 
       M 0.068 0.072 -1.700 0.789 
Agriculture U 0.110 0.069 14.387 0.000 
       M 0.110 0.131 -7.377 0.345 
Governement and Public Adm. U 0.016 0.021 -3.419 0.301 
       M 0.016 0.012 3.446 0.561 
Education U 0.070 0.124 -18.225 0.000 
       M 0.070 0.063 2.374 0.681 
Science and Culture U 0.007 0.030 -16.959 0.001 
       M 0.007 0.009 -1.743 0.705 
Health U 0.042 0.086 -18.095 0.000 
       M 0.042 0.042 0.000 1.000 
Defense, Ministry Internal  U 0.035 0.053 -8.643 0.009 
      Affairs, Security Service M 0.035 0.035 0.000 1.000 
Trade, Consumer Services U 0.142 0.099 13.414 0.000 
       M 0.142 0.121 6.456 0.364 
Finances U 0.023 0.017 4.365 0.695 
       M 0.023 0.030 -4.964 0.527 
Energy (Power) Industry U 0.021 0.020 0.849 0.248 
       M 0.021 0.030 -6.595 0.388 
Housing and Communal Services U 0.065 0.045 8.842 0.040 
       M 0.065 0.075 -4.085 0.593 
Other U 0.086 0.069 6.356 0.085
       M 0.086 0.077 3.482 0.618 
Military U 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.043 
       M 0.000 0.000 . . 
Legislators, senior managers,  U 0.035 0.035 -0.125 0.569 
      officials M 0.035 0.028 3.798 0.558 
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Professionals U 0.128 0.192 -17.372 0.000 
       M 0.128 0.112 4.466 0.463 
Technicians and Associate  U 0.163 0.174 -2.952 0.714 
      Professionals M 0.163 0.168 -1.244 0.854 
Clerks U 0.061 0.060 0.289 0.859 
       M 0.061 0.044 6.852 0.284 
Service workers and market  U 0.103 0.086 5.632 0.252 
      workers M 0.103 0.084 6.378 0.348 
Skilled agricultural and fishery U 0.009 0.005 5.603 0.314 
      workers M 0.009 0.009 0.000 1.000 
Craft and related trades U 0.133 0.145 -3.464 0.470 
       M 0.133 0.172 -11.454 0.107 
Plant and Machine operators U 0.231 0.190 10.099 0.111 
       M 0.231 0.256 -6.297 0.382 
Elementary unskilled workers U 0.138 0.114 7.181 0.005 
       M 0.138 0.126 3.516 0.614 
U=Unmatched Sample; M=Matched Sample. Source: Authors’ calculations based on 
RLMS supplement on displacement and main RLMS data.  
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Table 2: The effect of displacement on labor market outcomes 
 
 All individuals Employed only Employed only Industry-
switchers 
Quarters 
before-after 
Monthly earnings Hours Hourly wage Employment Hourly wage Hourly wage 
 FE PS 
Matching 
FE PS  
Matching 
FE PS  
Matching 
FE PS 
Matching 
FE PS  
Matching 
FE PS  
Matching 
bef_D_4 693.873 -222.20 1.420 -0.35 4.784 -2.21 0.060*** 0.00 2.125 -2.21 1.235 -5.21 
 (969.907) (827.03) (0.951) (  0.83) (4.523) (  4.90) (0.016) ( 0.00) (4.663) (  4.90) (5.449) (7.45) 
bef_D_3 1,009.654 706.67 1.226 -0.12 6.196 3.04 0.064*** 0.00 3.389 3.18 -3.110 -6.16 
 (1,126.188) (987.83) (0.968) (  0.78) (5.719) (  5.72) (0.016) ( 0.00) (5.960) (  5.73) (5.383) (6.50) 
bef_D_2 1,399.180 60.84 1.624* -0.19 6.470 -0.43 0.065*** 0.00 3.437 -0.52 -0.769 -9.53* 
 (1,308.468) (905.86) (0.922) (  0.77) (6.103) (  5.24) (0.017) ( 0.00) (6.138) (  5.23) (6.912) (5.76) 
bef_D_1 1,360.638 -60.34 2.037** -0.15 6.620 -2.31 0.080*** 0.00 2.924 -2.18 -1.307 -7.01 
 (1,253.779) (878.74) (0.951) (  0.80) (5.931) (  5.08) (0.017) ( 0.00) (6.027) (  5.09) (6.421) (5.91) 
bef_D_0 -962.046 -2094.69*** 1.605 -0.46 -24.897*** -31.76*** -0.382*** -0.44*** -8.568* -5.10 -12.774** -10.01 
 (855.414) (610.65) (0.998) (  0.88) (4.854) (  3.69) (0.029) (  0.03) (5.097) (  5.39) (5.837) (6.54) 
aft_D_1 -3,508.651*** -4046.03*** 0.103 -1.77* -18.064*** -24.79*** -0.324*** -0.38*** 1.424 6.53 -2.745 5.55 
 (979.532) (703.30) (1.101) (  1.00) (5.170) (  4.28) (0.029) (  0.03) (5.696) (  6.12) (6.700) (7.46) 
aft_D_2 -2,599.361** -3994.91*** -2.186* -4.59*** -13.571*** -23.51*** -0.269*** -0.32*** 0.233 -2.23 -4.993 -3.72 
 (1,038.356) (730.96) (1.250) (  1.19) (5.174) (  4.66) (0.029) (  0.03) (5.483) (  6.19) (6.026) (6.81) 
aft_D_3 -2,492.274** -3770.34*** -5.502*** -7.76*** -9.857* -20.28*** -0.233*** -0.28*** 2.510 -4.02 -0.664 -2.31 
 (1,054.401) (747.54) (1.360) (  1.30) (5.486) (  5.58) (0.029) (  0.03) (6.074) (  7.48) (7.691) (9.85) 
aft_D_4 -2,089.118* -3331.63*** -7.199*** -9.39*** -11.292** -22.22*** -0.207*** -0.25*** -1.138 -8.82 -7.821 -7.62 
 (1,081.424) (755.80) (1.426) (  1.41) (5.374) (  4.85) (0.029) (  0.03) (5.848) (  6.06) (6.440) (6.06) 
aft_D_5 -2,260.956** -3526.02*** -6.091*** -8.60*** -10.594* -21.36*** -0.194*** -0.25*** -0.099 -7.47 -8.360 -12.64 
 (1,106.777) (793.59) (1.398) (  1.42) (5.612) (  5.16) (0.029) (  0.03) (6.166) (  6.47) (7.106) (7.70) 
aft_D_6 -2,340.053** -3380.51*** -5.873*** -8.69*** -10.423* -18.97*** -0.174*** -0.22*** -0.879 -8.29 -7.745 -11.77 
 (1,116.215) (796.35) (1.400) (  1.46) (5.635) (  5.17) (0.029) (  0.03) (6.140) (  6.57) (7.097) (7.78) 
aft_D_7 -1,997.477* -3142.07*** -5.490*** -7.80*** -10.399* -15.54*** -0.150*** -0.18*** -0.888 -7.01 -6.686 -14.13* 
 (1,104.890) (837.15) (1.433) (  1.51) (5.508) (  5.45) (0.029) (  0.03) (6.107) (  6.90) (7.216) (8.27) 
aft_D_8 -2,399.885** -3323.08*** -5.221*** -7.32*** -9.561* -17.73*** -0.155*** -0.21*** -0.414 -5.67 -7.140 -8.25 
 (1,129.505) (891.02) (1.455) (  1.60) (5.607) (  6.00) (0.030) (  0.03) (6.466) (  7.19) (7.963) (7.94) 
aft_D_9 -2,429.344** -3026.65*** -5.123*** -6.75*** -11.291* -19.33*** -0.147*** -0.19*** -2.821 -9.66 -11.676 -10.42 
 (1,179.366) (998.08) (1.507) (  1.73) (5.760) (  6.37) (0.030) (  0.03) (6.648) (  7.63) (7.640) (7.53) 
aft_D_10 -2,063.739* -2131.99** -3.556** -5.63*** -9.372 -13.23** -0.140*** -0.18*** -1.175 -3.94 -6.078 -9.53 
 (1,193.022) (1054.02) (1.547) (  1.75) (5.967) (  6.06) (0.031) (  0.03) (6.855) (  7.39) (8.193) (9.45) 
aft_D_11 -2,513.577** -1884.68* -2.495 -4.96*** -13.655** -14.26** -0.155*** -0.19*** -5.866 -1.43 -11.707 -4.16 
 (1,208.026) (1091.05) (1.558) (  1.86) (5.799) (  6.16) (0.033) (  0.04) (6.901) (  7.10) (8.149) (8.30) 
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 All individuals Employed only Employed only Industry-
switchers 
Quarters 
before-after 
Monthly earnings Hours Hourly wage Employment Hourly wage Hourly wage 
 FE PS 
Matching 
FE PS  
Matching 
FE PS  
Matching 
FE PS 
Matching 
FE PS  
Matching 
FE PS  
Matching 
aft_D_12 -2,666.033** -1327.01 -2.798* -5.18*** -12.739** -10.26 -0.151*** -0.19*** -2.956 3.92 -9.632 -1.98 
 (1,272.251) (1169.59) (1.595) (  1.96) (6.050) (  6.64) (0.033) (  0.04) (7.085) (  7.71) (8.593) (8.88) 
aft_D_13 -2,874.242** -2240.34* -4.185** -6.64*** -11.258* -12.77* -0.140*** -0.19*** -2.391 1.62 -12.040 -9.33 
 (1,343.653) (1266.51) (1.675) (  2.16) (6.327) (  7.68) (0.035) (  0.04) (7.662) (  8.88) (9.208) (9.59) 
aft_D_14 -2,888.156** -2123.24 -4.380** -6.26*** -9.817 -8.79 -0.129*** -0.18*** -2.330 5.64 -12.719 -4.14 
 (1,354.347) (1325.31) (1.743) (  2.37) (6.274) (  7.81) (0.038) (  0.04) (8.040) (  8.79) (9.635) (9.57) 
aft_D_15 -3,227.265** -1117.56 -5.003** -6.32** -8.964 -4.24 -0.130*** -0.18*** -1.209 5.13 -16.001 -6.37 
 (1,479.495) (1439.03) (1.946) (  2.81) (7.081) (  9.88) (0.043) (  0.05) (9.281) ( 11.97) (10.650) (    11.74) 
aft_D_16 -3,853.777** -1250.66 -4.478** -8.36*** -14.509** -4.91 -0.147*** -0.19*** -9.000 2.93 -19.976 -1.94 
 (1,643.753) (1492.18) (2.088) (  3.54) (6.803) (  8.62) (0.048) (  0.07) (9.412) (  9.83) (12.596) (    11.85) 
Constant 10,781.652***  42.015***  61.527***  0.986***  63.467***  63.772***  
 (133.988)  (0.126)  (0.749)  (0.003)  (0.653)  (0.617)  
Obs. 79354  84176  78063  85978  72152  68406  
Notes: Robust (corrected for matching) standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3: The effect of displacement on additional labor market outcomes 
 
Quarters 
before-
after 
Permanent written 
contract 
Oral contract without 
written agreement 
Number of benefits Monetary value of 
benefits 
 FE PS 
Matching 
FE PS 
Matching 
FE PS 
Matching 
FE PS 
Matching 
bef_D_4 -0.062* -0.01 0.030* 0.01 -0.253** -0.40*** -273.159 -524.52* 
 (0.034) (0.02) (0.018) (0.02) (0.121) (0.14) (211.570) (274.36) 
bef_D_3 -0.051 -0.02 0.031* 0.02 -0.239* -0.45*** 119.539 -0.27 
 (0.033) (0.02) (0.018) (0.01) (0.123) (0.13) (520.780) (612.54) 
bef_D_2 -0.052 -0.02 0.025 0.02 -0.254** -0.45*** 54.117 -40.01 
 (0.034) (0.02) (0.017) (0.01) (0.124) (0.13) (490.949) (560.17) 
bef_D_1 -0.052 -0.02 0.025 0.01 -0.230* -0.43*** -6.306 -197.42 
 (0.034) (0.02) (0.018) (0.01) (0.126) (0.12) (477.998) (523.16) 
bef_D_0 -0.139*** -0.11*** 0.053** 0.04** -0.314** -0.48*** -522.039* -343.17 
 (0.041) (0.03) (0.021) (0.02) (0.156) (0.18) (270.367) (321.47) 
aft_D_1 -0.151*** -0.13*** 0.057*** 0.04* -0.569*** -0.78*** -316.077 123.23 
 (0.042) (0.03) (0.021) (0.02) (0.168) (0.17) (359.215) (383.41) 
aft_D_2 -0.141*** -0.09*** 0.066*** 0.04* -0.629*** -0.74*** -387.035 -122.94 
 (0.041) (0.03) (0.023) (0.02) (0.160) (0.17) (351.619) (359.66) 
aft_D_3 -0.156*** -0.12*** 0.068*** 0.05*** -0.598*** -0.67*** -488.811 -267.33 
 (0.042) (0.03) (0.023) (0.02) (0.162) (0.17) (349.147) (302.33) 
aft_D_4 -0.132*** -0.11*** 0.056** 0.05*** -0.537*** -0.75*** -287.500 -153.03 
 (0.042) (0.03) (0.024) (0.02) (0.165) (0.17) (361.740) (294.87) 
aft_D_5 -0.141*** -0.12*** 0.066*** 0.07*** -0.570*** -0.83*** -209.595 -214.89 
 (0.043) (0.03) (0.025) (0.02) (0.168) (0.17) (348.524) (309.80) 
aft_D_6 -0.129*** -0.08*** 0.064*** 0.05*** -0.532*** -0.77*** -106.431 -9.42 
 (0.042) (0.03) (0.025) (0.02) (0.170) (0.17) (350.541) (315.53) 
aft_D_7 -0.122*** -0.08*** 0.067*** 0.06*** -0.512*** -0.80*** -189.679 -37.02 
 (0.043) (0.03) (0.026) (0.02) (0.167) (0.18) (312.033) (290.80) 
aft_D_8 -0.115*** -0.09*** 0.062** 0.05** -0.524*** -0.67*** -110.780 183.74 
 (0.042) (0.04) (0.025) (0.02) (0.162) (0.19) (325.431) (320.41) 
aft_D_9 -0.105** -0.06* 0.063*** 0.06*** -0.525*** -0.85*** -66.028 116.23 
 (0.042) (0.04) (0.025) (0.02) (0.163) (0.20) (326.598) (336.53) 
aft_D_10 -0.120*** -0.08** 0.060** 0.05** -0.565*** -1.01*** 125.622 397.07 
 (0.042) (0.04) (0.024) (0.02) (0.161) (0.20) (416.122) (479.94) 
aft_D_11 -0.114*** -0.08** 0.066*** 0.05** -0.583*** -1.06*** -135.312 136.25 
 (0.043) (0.04) (0.025) (0.02) (0.167) (0.21) (346.574) (421.24) 
aft_D_12 -0.116*** -0.10** 0.068*** 0.06*** -0.546*** -0.94*** -25.303 609.67 
 (0.044) (0.04) (0.025) (0.03) (0.173) (0.23) (355.977) (464.42) 
aft_D_13 -0.156*** -0.16*** 0.089*** 0.10*** -0.571*** -0.92*** -45.706 640.65 
 (0.045) (0.05) (0.026) (0.03) (0.173) (0.24) (361.220) (477.06) 
aft_D_14 -0.171*** -0.18*** 0.088*** 0.10*** -0.526*** -0.91*** -32.632 562.89 
 (0.047) (0.05) (0.026) (0.03) (0.178) (0.24) (386.961) (487.57) 
aft_D_15 -0.165*** -0.21*** 0.075*** 0.08** -0.512*** -1.03*** -26.070 498.65 
 (0.050) (0.06) (0.027) (0.04) (0.191) (0.30) (418.504) (590.62) 
aft_D_16 -0.207*** -0.20*** 0.085*** 0.10*** -0.509** -0.82** -88.002 688.09 
 (0.055) (0.07) (0.028) (0.04) (0.219) (0.37) (493.210) (738.46) 
Constant 0.917***  0.015***  3.282***  2,460.5***  
 (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.013)  (32.916)  
Obs. 80067  80067  79867  80067  
Notes: Robust (corrected for matching) standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
NOTE: in the pscore estimation there is a dummy for each type of benefit. Although dummies are balanced 
this is not sufficient to balance the number of benefit in the pre-displacement period (zero is out of the 
confidence interval). 
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Table 4a: Robustness checks: Estimates from matching procedure 
 
 Include U benefits instead of 
zeroes 
 
Displaced group excludes “dismissal initiated by employer” and “personnel 
reduction” 
Quartes 
before / after 
Monthly 
earnings+ 
initial U ben. 
Monthly 
earnings+ 
final U ben. 
Monthly 
earnings 
Hours Hourly 
wage: all 
Employment Hourly 
wage: re-
employed 
only 
-4 -222.20 -222.20 -828.45 -0.29 -2.61 0.00 -2.98 
 (827.03) (827.03) (1026.19) (0.86) (5.61) (0.00) (5.60) 
-3 706.67 706.67 -307.08 -0.62 -0.21 0.00 -0.36 
 (987.83) (987.83) (1259.42) (0.87) (6.90) (0.00) (6.91) 
-2 60.84 60.84 -426.35 0.03 -4.34 0.00 -4.15 
 (905.86) (905.86) (1100.82) (0.78) (6.55) (0.00) (6.56) 
-1 -60.34 -60.34 -851.86 0.27 -5.81 0.00 -5.81 
 (878.74) (878.74) (1120.79) (0.76) (6.57) (0.00) (6.57) 
0 -1855.59*** -1916.91*** -2445.26*** -0.95 -32.65*** -0.42*** -11.80 
 (609.02) (609.65) (818.85) (0.88) (4.57) (0.03) (8.68) 
1 -3800.77*** -3868.93*** -4141.55*** -1.48 -23.54*** -0.34*** 5.21 
 (698.58) (699.84) (853.43) (0.99) (4.75) (0.03) (6.76) 
2 -3831.01*** -3867.75*** -3698.72*** -3.84*** -18.19*** -0.28*** 3.84 
 (727.12) (727.98) (878.18) (1.20) (4.94) (0.03) (6.50) 
3 -3652.97*** -3682.35*** -2963.60*** -6.39*** -11.94** -0.22*** 4.73 
 (744.69) (745.34) (894.84) (1.32) (6.07) (0.03) (7.97) 
4 -3242.17*** -3264.65*** -2565.40*** -7.62*** -14.74*** -0.20*** -1.46 
 (753.34) (754.05) (930.09) (1.43) (5.17) (0.03) (6.31) 
5 -3435.41*** -3458.78*** -2803.83*** -6.42*** -13.78*** -0.18*** -2.88 
 (790.90) (791.62) (999.32) (1.44) (5.80) (0.03) (7.10) 
6 -3350.99*** -3354.99*** -3046.80*** -6.08*** -14.49*** -0.15*** -6.44 
 (794.22) (794.20) (1018.29) (1.52) (6.01) (0.03) (7.78) 
7 -3127.81*** -3129.45*** -2864.58*** -5.26*** -13.44** -0.15*** -0.05 
 (836.14) (836.18) (1038.66) (1.62) (6.18) (0.03) (7.15) 
8 -3330.08*** -3335.78*** -2919.29*** -4.03*** -13.43** -0.14*** -0.81 
 (889.82) (889.75) (1079.82) (1.69) (6.33) (0.03) (7.30) 
9 -3034.26*** -3040.25*** -2929.89*** -4.02** -15.06** -0.15*** -2.54 
 (996.82) (996.74) (1187.64) (1.77) (6.63) (0.04) (7.56) 
10 -2142.22** -2148.42** -1784.27 -3.41* -9.21 -0.15*** 2.68 
 (1052.53) (1052.45) (1219.66) (1.78) (6.65) (0.04) (7.48) 
11 -1893.84* -1900.57* -2697.68** -2.96 -15.92** -0.18*** -3.48 
 (1089.46) (1089.37) (1279.54) (1.92) (6.85) (0.04) (7.94) 
12 -1342.01 -1350.80 -2627.10* -3.85* -11.01 -0.18*** 0.53 
 (1167.96) (1167.92) (1413.73) (2.02) (7.55) (0.04) (8.70) 
13 -2266.39* -2272.47* -3293.17** -4.72** -16.15* -0.16*** -5.46 
 (1264.98) (1264.70) (1478.96) (2.16) (8.51) (0.04) (9.78) 
14 -2151.79 -2158.45 -3963.53*** -5.30*** -15.55* -0.17*** -6.44 
 (1323.50) (1323.17) (1537.71) (2.27) (8.51) (0.05) (9.68) 
15 -1131.71 -1139.75 -3446.58** -4.88* -12.85 -0.15*** -0.01 
 (1435.31) (1434.87) (1757.40) (2.82) ( 11.14) (0.06) ( 13.25) 
16 -1298.27 -1309.38 -3190.65* -3.67 -14.39 -0.17*** -8.68 
 (1487.63) (1486.80) (1864.66) (3.30) (9.91) (0.07) ( 11.26) 
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Table 4b (continued): Robustness checks: Estimates from matching procedure 
 
 Displaced workers who did not receive any prior 
notification 
No quitters in the control group 
Quartes 
before / 
after 
Monthly 
earnings 
Hours Employment Hourly 
wage re-
employed 
Monthly 
earnings 
Hours Employment Hourly 
wage re-
employed 
-4 -608.14 -0.92 0.00 -1.98 -78.50 -0.92 0.00 0.81 
 (1006.62) (1.06) (0.00) (5.43) ( 792.68) (0.89) (0.00) (4.31) 
-3 220.79 -0.75 0.00 1.54 0.70 -0.52 0.00 0.56 
 (1239.18) (0.98) (0.00) (6.94) ( 998.40) (0.84) (0.00) (5.52) 
-2 -336.39 -1.32 0.00 -1.14 -479.86 -0.50 0.00 -1.16 
 (1127.21) (1.03) (0.00) (6.38) ( 919.70) (0.79) (0.00) (5.01) 
-1 -489.14 -0.63 0.00 -1.96 -422.93 -0.09 0.00 -1.60 
 (1104.01) (0.98) (0.00) (6.20) ( 893.50) (0.75) (0.00) (4.91) 
0 -1924.34*** -0.96 -0.45*** 2.77 -2135.92*** -0.58 -0.44*** -3.00 
 ( 730.23) (1.07) (0.03) (5.60) ( 624.51) (0.78) (0.03) (5.09) 
1 -4542.44*** -1.88 -0.36*** 4.71 -4225.77*** -2.13** -0.38*** 4.94 
 ( 806.42) (1.19) (0.03) (5.72) ( 713.21) (0.92) (0.03) (6.00) 
2 -4181.87*** -4.42*** -0.32*** -1.21 -3829.82*** -4.95*** -0.33*** -0.26 
 ( 843.80) (1.32) (0.03) (5.84) ( 745.10) (1.13) (0.03) (5.70) 
3 -3740.82*** -7.57*** -0.26*** 4.91 -3806.95*** -7.57*** -0.28*** 2.46 
 ( 863.47) (1.48) (0.03) (7.94) ( 788.69) (1.27) (0.03) (7.07) 
4 -2937.66*** -8.48*** -0.24*** -1.60 -3230.36*** -9.04*** -0.26*** -2.72 
 ( 875.21) (1.62) (0.03) (5.81) ( 815.48) (1.37) (0.03) (5.60) 
5 -3501.92*** -7.09*** -0.22*** -2.20 -3227.65*** -7.76*** -0.25*** -0.41 
 ( 918.96) (1.59) (0.03) (6.56) ( 848.47) (1.36) (0.03) (6.02) 
6 -3829.62*** -7.21*** -0.21*** -6.74 -3728.76*** -8.04*** -0.23*** -3.06 
 ( 957.71) (1.65) (0.03) (7.03) ( 872.14) (1.38) (0.03) (6.10) 
7 -3561.94*** -6.80*** -0.18*** -3.42 -3250.53*** -7.38*** -0.20*** -2.06 
 ( 992.92) (1.71) (0.03) (7.16) ( 919.99) (1.42) (0.03) (6.54) 
8 -3236.86*** -7.54*** -0.19*** -0.63 -3070.94*** -6.88*** -0.22*** -2.82 
 (1060.86) (1.86) (0.04) (6.86) ( 948.96) (1.53) (0.03) (6.83) 
9 -3395.49*** -7.40*** -0.19*** -8.76 -2866.97*** -6.81*** -0.21*** -4.52 
 (1095.02) (1.99) (0.04) (6.89) (1044.53) (1.63) (0.03) (7.18) 
10 -2309.60* -5.49*** -0.15*** -6.02 -1523.76 -5.04*** -0.20*** 1.88 
 (1234.77) (2.01) (0.04) (7.78) (1096.65) (1.65) (0.03) (7.31) 
11 -3468.86*** -4.08* -0.17*** -11.93 -2662.45** -4.14*** -0.22*** -5.49 
 (1285.42) (2.13) (0.04) (7.90) (1212.74) (1.72) (0.04) (8.33) 
12 -3290.72*** -4.53** -0.18*** -12.28 -2385.81* -4.14** -0.22*** -1.83 
 (1320.49) (2.23) (0.05) (8.52) (1336.05) (1.81) (0.04) (9.27) 
13 -4025.35*** -6.17*** -0.16*** -9.72 -3895.87*** -5.21*** -0.22*** -8.36 
 (1318.37) (2.52) (0.05) (8.44) (1612.86) (2.00) (0.04) (  11.85) 
14 -4332.74*** -5.54** -0.18*** -4.25 -4141.89*** -3.89* -0.20*** -13.28 
 (1347.61) (2.62) (0.05) (7.90) (1733.12) (2.11) (0.04) (  12.84) 
15 -3811.09*** -7.81*** -0.17*** 4.57 -4664.01** -4.23* -0.20*** -18.90 
 (1528.04) (3.22) (0.06) (  11.97) (2066.79) (2.56) (0.05) (  16.64) 
16 -3016.26 -8.79** -0.20*** 14.92 -2512.94 -5.96* -0.21*** -5.38 
 (1980.02) (3.89) (0.08) (  11.74) (1644.47) (3.22) (0.06) (  12.86) 
Notes: Corrected standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. 
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Table 5: Robustness check: informal employment proxied by non-receipt of fringe 
benefits 1, 2, and 3 
 
Quarters before / 
after 
Fixed effect Matching 
bef_D_4 0.068** 0.07*** 
 (0.034) (0.03) 
bef_D_3 0.066* 0.09*** 
 (0.034) (0.03) 
bef_D_2 0.070** 0.09*** 
 (0.034) (0.03) 
bef_D_1 0.069** 0.09*** 
 (0.035) (0.03) 
bef_D_0 0.113*** 0.13*** 
 (0.041) (0.04) 
aft_D_1 0.139*** 0.15*** 
 (0.043) (0.04) 
aft_D_2 0.146*** 0.13*** 
 (0.042) (0.04) 
aft_D_3 0.134*** 0.13*** 
 (0.043) (0.04) 
aft_D_4 0.128*** 0.12*** 
 (0.043) (0.04) 
aft_D_5 0.140*** 0.14*** 
 (0.044) (0.04) 
aft_D_6 0.136*** 0.12*** 
 (0.045) (0.04) 
aft_D_7 0.125*** 0.10*** 
 (0.044) (0.04)
aft_D_8 0.118*** 0.07 
 (0.044) (0.04) 
aft_D_9 0.114** 0.10** 
 (0.045) (0.04) 
aft_D_10 0.117*** 0.13*** 
 (0.045) (0.04) 
aft_D_11 0.130*** 0.13*** 
 (0.046) (0.05) 
aft_D_12 0.131*** 0.10* 
 (0.047) (0.05) 
aft_D_13 0.140*** 0.09 
 (0.047) (0.06) 
aft_D_14 0.124** 0.07 
 (0.048) (0.06) 
aft_D_15 0.122** 0.13* 
 (0.052) (0.07) 
aft_D_16 0.108* 0.08 
 (0.060) (0.08) 
Constant 0.116***  
 (0.003)  
Observations 80067  
R-squared 0.01  
NOTE: in the pscore estimation there is a dummy for each type of benefit. Although dummies are balanced 
this is not sufficient to balance the number of benefits in the pre-displacement period. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Selected key economic indicators for Russia. 
 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
GDP per capita (2000 US$) 2693 2602 2465 2106 1926 1686 1618 1564 1591 1511 1614 1775 1870 1968 2122 2286 2444 2637 2868 3030 
GDP growth rate, %  -3.0 -5.0 -14.5 -8.7 -12.6 -4.1 -3.6 1.4 -5.3 6.4 10.0 5.1 4.7 7.3 7.2 6.4 7.7 8.1 5.6 
GDP as % of GDP 1989 100.0 97.0 92.1 78.7 71.9 62.7 60.2 58.0 58.8 55.7 59.3 65.2 68.5 71.7 77.0 82.5 87.8 94.6 102.2 107.9 
Employment ratio, % 83.6 83.4 81.7 78.6 75.5 70.9 69.6 68.2 65.1 63.0 67.7 69.9 69.6 70.7 69.7 69.8 70.3 70.9 72.8 73.6 
Employment in industry       34.0 32.5 30.0 29.1 28.2 28.4 29.4 29.5 30.4 29.7 29.8 29.3 29.2 28.9 
Employment in agriculture       15.7 15.3 12.2 11.7 15.0 14.5 12.0 11.3 10.9 10.2 10.2 10.0 9.0 8.6 
ILO unemployment rate, %    5.2 5.9 8.1 9.4 9.7 11.8 13.3 13.0 10.6 9.0 7.9 8.2 7.8 7.2 7.2 6.1 6.3 
Long-term unemployment 
incidence, %    12.2 15.2 23.1 29.7 32.8 38.1 41.0 47.2 42.3 36.9 39.2 37.6 39.0 38.5 41.7 38.9 33.3 
Youth unemployment rate, %    13.0 13.5 16.3 18.8 19.3 23.5 27.1 23.9 20.7 18.0 15.6 17.5 17.2 15.7 16.5 14.7 14.1 
Gini coefficient (earnings) 0.271 0.269 0.325 0.371 0.461 0.446 0.471 0.483     0.521 0.491  0.469 0.445 0.451 0.439 0.423 
Real wages growth rate, %   -3.4 -32.7 0.4 -7.9 -28.0 6.0 4.7 -13.0 -22.0 21.0 20.0 16.0 10.9 10.6 12.6 13.3 17.2 11.5 
Sources: Transmonee database, World Bank, ILO, and Rosstat. 
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Table A2.  Reasons for leaving job and classification as quit or displacement 
 
REASON CLASSIFICATION 
1 Closing down of enterprise/organization Displacement 
2 Moving of enterprise/organization  
3Reorganization of enterprise/organization           
Displacement 
    Displacement 
4 Bankruptcy of enterprise/organization Displacement 
5 Privatization of enterprise/organization Displacement 
6 Dismissal initiated by employer Displacement 
7 Personnel reduction Displacement 
8 Expiring of employment contract Quit 
9 Expiring of probation time Quit 
10 Military service  Quit 
11 Imprisonment Quit 
12 Own illness or injury  Quit 
13 Studies Quit 
14 Retirement Quit 
15 Early retirement Quit 
16 Marriage  Quit 
17 Parental leave  Quit 
18 Need to take care of other members of family  Quit 
19 Change of residence Quit 
20 Wanted/was proposed higher salary  Quit 
21 Wanted/was proposed better working conditions  Quit 
22 Wanted/was proposed more interesting work  Quit 
23 Wanted to start own business Quit 
24 Main job became second job  Quit 
25 End of farming/sole proprietorship  Quit 
26 Other Variable  
 
 
 
